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the people. In this respect the brief volume before us is a valuable contribution to the literature of political philosophy.

C. G. FENWICK.

The History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914.
Being an Account of the Negotiations Preceding the Outbreak of War, Based on the Official Publications. By J. W. HEADLAM, M.A., formerly Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. (New York: Scribner's. 1915. Pp. xxiv and 412.)

In the opinion of the reviewer this is one of the very best books, which has been published on the immediate causes of the war. It is fuller than Beck's *Evidence in the Case*; constructed from ampler materials than Price's *Diplomatic History of the War*; and worthy to stand beside Stowell's excellent *Diplomacy of the War of 1914*. It is altogether unlike the numerous biased and exaggerated accounts which have been written by advocates on both sides, since it is throughout founded upon a full exposition and careful interpretation of the primary documents upon which at present our conclusions must be based. About a third of it is made up of parts of the papers published by the various European governments, which are neither scantily quoted nor printed at length in appendixes, but set into the text of the volume, in the actual narrative of which they take their proper part. And it is a tribute to the skill of the author and his mastery of the documents which he uses that such numerous and often lengthy extracts inset and printed in smaller type little interrupt the story or seem out of place in the absorbing narrative where they stand.

In such a book the opinion of the author about his sources is of great value, and it is to be noted that his confidence in the British White Paper and the French Yellow Book results from the fact that notwithstanding difference in character they seem to him amply to explain and corroborate each other in matters of occurrence. The Belgian Grey Book and the Serbian Blue Book assist in only a small portion of his account, while the Russian Orange Book and the Austrian Red Book are satisfactory as far as they go but disappointing because they leave so much untold. Least satisfying of all, he thinks, is the German White Book, which is both scanty and lacking in qualities to inspire confidence. "The feeling left upon my mind after a long and careful study of all that has been put forward by the German Government is that it is impossible to put any reliance on anything that they say

either with regard to their own motives or intentions, or in regard to the simplest facts, unless their statements are amply corroborated from other sources" (p. xi).

The book consists of two parts, in each of which there are introductory chapters, in the first on Serbia and Austria, including an account of the fateful note, and in the second a chapter on Great Britain and the *Entente Cordiale*, and another on the history of Belgium. The remainder of the work, saving four short appendixes, has to do with the difficult story of the negotiations and diplomatic working in the days from July 24 to August 4. The narrative is admirably arranged, so that the story is always clear and the conclusions decisive. The papers of all the governments are used throughout to whatever extent they can throw light upon the situation, and as far as I have been able to note they are used accurately and in good faith. The statements of the different representatives are carefully examined and subjected to intelligent criticism in comparison with each other. Nowhere have I noticed the deplorable tendency, so common in lesser works on this subject, to employ the documents for the purpose of illustrating and embellishing theories already conceived; but the documents are studied so that the author may discover what story they tell, he interpreting them and explaining as he understands them. He does not follow the easy method of apparent fairness, which consists in avoiding difficulties by coming to no conclusion, or by artificial distribution of praise and blame to both sides. He makes his own interpretations and he has his own point of view, which is favorable to the allies of the *Entente*; but his point of view is frankly stated so that the reader is not deceived by it, and this point of view remains merely a factor subordinate to the documents and the statements deduced from them, whereas in some of the writing of Burgess, Münsterberg, and others the point of view and ideas preconceived appear to be body and soul of the work with facts and documents subsidiary.

Among the numerous conclusions which the work contains may be set down the author's opinion that the note to Serbia was deliberately so framed as to be an ultimatum, so phrased as to insure rejection, and with such scant time allowed as to make it impossible for other nations to assist in obtaining the satisfaction demanded and so avoid war; that Russia tried in vain to have the time extended; that Russian mobilization was justifiable and necessary for her interests; that Germany would not have given Austria a free hand if she had not known in advance the nature and contents of the note to Serbia, though it may be

that it was not communicated to the German government in official form before it was sent: that probably Prince Lichnowsky in London did not know this and may not have been in the secrets of his government; that England and France, and apparently Russia, did not want war, and strove honorably to avoid it; that Sir Edward Grey endeavored to accomplish this by all means in his power, desiring to substitute a concert of the powers for two great hostile alliances; that by July 28 Germany had resolved upon war, and that thereafter neither partial nor total mobilization by Russia really determined the matter; that British diplomacy was wise in preserving a non-committal attitude to the very end; that England, whatever, might have developed afterwards, was actually brought into the struggle by the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

I have noted one or two typographical errors, and a few mistakes of minor importance, and I believe that a table of the days of the week in connection with the dates of the twelve days would be of great service to the average reader. But in respect of all more important matters I have found the book admirable and interesting, and I believe it deserving of very high praise.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER.

The European War of 1914: Its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results. By JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS, Ph.D., J.U.D., LL.D. Formerly Professor of Constitutional and International Law, and Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, and Pure Science, in Columbia University. (Chicago: McClurg and Co. 1915. Pp. ix and 209.)

This book, as a contribution to war literature, little merits a review, but it does serve very well to illustrate the faults which characterize a great deal of similar writing on the same subject. It may be said at once that the volume makes pleasant reading, and that some portions of it are interesting and instructive, especially those least related to the theme which it purports to treat of. The author certainly makes good his contention that American export of munitions is a right and not a duty (ch. vii); and parts of his description of the Dual Monarchy are excellent (pp. 160 to 162). More than a third of the volume has to do with the good qualities of Germans, and the service rendered by Germans in America in former days with England's old hostility and oppression, and with other things which pro-German advocates in this